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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conditional Sales-Liability in Self-Help Repossessions
Plaintiff, a subscriber to defendant's telephone service, was delinquent
in his payments. An agent of the 'defendant obtained unauthorized en-
trance to plaintiff's apartment from one of the apartment employees and
removed the telephone. Plaintiff sued for wilful trespass. The South
Carolina federal district court, following cases involving repossession of
chattels sold under a conditional sales contract or chattel mortgage, found
for the defendant.1
The prevailing view as to rights and liabilities in actions for repos-
session of chattels is that the vendor has the right to repossess in the
event of default.2 The right is an irrevocable license to do whatever is
necessary to accomplish the repossession, including entry upon the
premises of the vendee. However, the retaking must be effected with-
out a breach of the peace. If it cannot be executed without breaching
the peace, the vendor must resort to the courts.3 The question in each
case, then, is, did the repossessing vendor commit a trespass or breach
of the peace? Because of the varied fact situations it is difficult to
formulate a set of rules; but by examining the holdings, it is possible to
define a guiding line in certain types of cases.
In cases involving trespass against land the vendor may enter the
vendee's land to repossess a conditionally sold chattel even in the absence
of a contractual stipulation to that effect.4 Where there is a contractual
provision, the privilege to enter is 'deemed irrevocable on the grounds
that it is a part of the consideration.5 However, the vendor will be held
liable for any act constituting a trespass or a breach of the peace. 6 Where
'Plate v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 98 F. Supp. 355 (E. D. S. C. 1951).
'Willis v. Whittle, 82 S. C. 500, 64 S. E. 410 (1909). Quoted with approval in
Day v. Nat. Bond & Investment Co., 99 S. W. 2d 117 (Mo. 1936); Lange v.
Midwest Motor Securities, 231 S. W. 272 (Mo. 1921) ; Bear v. Colonial Finance
Co., 42 Ohio App. 482, 182 N. E. 521 (1932); Westerman v. Oregon Automobile
Credit Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P. 2d 435 (1942) ; Soulias v. Mills Novelty Co.
198 S. C. 355, 17 S. E. 2d 869 (1941); Hutchinson v. A. K. Brown Motors Ihc.,
191 S. C. 319, 4 S. E. 2d 268 (1939); Justus v. Universal Credit Qo., 189 S. C.
487, 15 S. E. 2d 508 (1939).
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §272-b (1934); 14 C. J. S., CHATTEL MORTGAGES
§185; UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT §16.
'Flaherty v. Ginsberg, 135 Iowa 743, 110 N. W. 1050 (1907); Lange v. Mid-
west Motor Securities, 231 S. W. 272 (Mo. 1921) ; Westerman v. Oregon Auto-
mobile Credit Corp. 168 Ore. 216, 122 P. 2d 435 (1942); Justus v. Universal
Credit Co., 189 S. C. 487, 1 S. E. 2d 508 (1939). Contra: Van Wrenn v. Flynn,
34 La. Ann. 1158 (1882) (The right to retake the property did not confer upon
the vendor the right to enter the house of the vendee in his absence, without his
consent or notice, and carry off the property). Carter v. Mintz & Goldblum, 8
So. 2d 709 (La. 1942); Luthy v. Philip Werlein Co., 163 La. 752, 112 So. 709
(1927).
'Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592 (1874); Lambert v. Robinson, 162 Mass. 34
(1894); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Winter; 176 Okl. 400, 55 P. 2d 1029
(1936); Soulias v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S. C. 355, 17 S. E. 2d 869 (1941);
Justus v. Universal Credit Co., 189 S. C. 487, 1 S. E. 2d 508 (1939).
'American Discount Co. v. Wychroff, 29 Ala. App. 82, 191 So. 70 (1939);
Dooley v. West American Commercial Insurance Co., 133 Cal. App. 58, 23 P. 2d
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there is an actual forceful breaking-in, liability ensues, 7 including lia-
bility for damages suffered as a consequence of the act.s This is so
even where the contract of sale permits the use of force or where the
vendee waives his rights; the courts holding such stipulations as against
public policy.9 However, at least one court has allowed forceful re-
taking without liability.' 9
North Carolina is in accord with the general rule in allowing the
vendor to repossess,'1 but does not hold that the seller has the right to
enter the buyer's premises. In the only case found which is squarely
in point,12 nominal damages were awarded where defendant's agent
entered plaintiff's office in his home while plaintiff was away and re-
moved a machine used in his medical practice.
In cases where the retaking threatens a trespass against the person,
the vendor proceeds with the undertaking at his peril.18 Where de-
fendant's agent took a conditionally sold horse in the presence of plain-
tiff's mother and over her protests, there was no liability,14 but where
the agent was rude, harsh, and high-handed the court awarded dam-
766 (1933); Nat. Bond & Investment Co. v. Whithorn, 276 Ky. 204, 123 S. W. 2d
263 (1939); McLean v. Underdal, 73 N. D. 74, 11 N. W. 2d 102 (1943) ; Lamb
v. Woodry, 154 Ore. 30, 58 P. 2d 1257 (1936) ; Childress v. Judson Mills Store
Co., 189 S. C. 224, 200 S. E. 770 (1939). Compare R. C. A. Photophone v.
Shanum, 189 Ark. 797, 75 S.W. 2d 59 (1934) (Court held that there was no basis
for damages where defendant's agent surreptitiously entered plaintiff's motion
picture theatre and removed part of the sound equipment), with Girard v. Ander-
son, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N. W. 450 (1934) (Defendant was liable when his agent,
in plaintiff's absence, entered his unlocked house and removed his piano), and
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Hayes, 22 Ala. App. 254, 114 So. 420 (1927) (If
defendant went through an open door there was no liability, but if he broke into
the house he was guilty of trespass).
7 Dominick v. Rea, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N. W. 184 (1924) ; Wilson Motor Co.
v. Dunn, 129 Okl. 211, 264 Pac. 194 (1928) ; Soulias v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S. C.
355, 17 S. E. 2d 869 (1941) (Actual and punitive damages were awarded where
the vendor ripped the padlock and staple off plaintiff's door to repossess a com-
mercial ice cream machine) ; Childress v. Judson Mills Store Co., 189 S. C. 224,
200 S. E. 770 (1939) ; Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S. C. 451, 169, S. E. 236 (1933).
' General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hicks, 189 Ark. 62, 70 S. W. 2d 509
(1934) (Defendant's agent, in repossessing a refrigerator, broke into plaintiff's
storehouse leaving the storehouse open. In addition to being held liable for tres-
pass, defendant was assessed damages for other property subsequently removed by
thieves).
' Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 42, 257 N. W. 400 (1934) ; Sturman v. Polito,
161 Misc. 536, 291 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1936); Stewart v. F. A. North Co., 65 Pa.
Super. 195 (1916).
" Fulton Investment Co. v. Fraser, 76 Colo. 125, 230 Pac. 600 (1924) (De-
fendant was not liable for entering and taking possession of wheat held under a
chattel mortgage even though he broke the lock on the gate to plaintiff's farm in
the process).
"' Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N. C. 257, 171 S. E. 63
(1933).
2 Parris v. Fischer & Co., 221 N. C. 110, 19 S. E. 2d 128 (1942).
"I Girard v. Anderson 219 Iowa 142, 257 N. W. 400 (1934) (and cases there
cited).
",Willis v. Whittle, 82 S. C. 500, 64 S. E. 410 (1909).
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ages.15 If actual physical force is used, liability almost always results.
Thus, defendant was held liable when his agent pushed a front door
against plaintiff who was barring his entrance;16 where plaintiff was
pushed aside when she attempted to block defendant's exit;17 where
plaintiff, plaintiff's companion and defendant engaged in a "tug-of-war"
over a stove ;18 and where defendant's agent tipped a sewing machine
so that plaintiff, who was sitting on it to prevent its removal, slid to
the floor.19 Liability was also found where defendant and two police-
men pulled plaintiff's wife out of an automobile ;20 and where defendant,
in repossessing a car, pushed and pinched plaintiff to get him out of
the vehicle and then drove around at a dangerous speed in an endeavor
to get plaintiff off the running board.21  In some cases, where the con-
tract authorizes the use of force, the courts have held that the vendor
may use a reasonable and necessary force in retaking.2 2 However, most
courts refuse to recognize such contractual authority.23
North Carolina adopted a strict view in Freeman v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp.,24 where defendant was held liable for his agent's
harsh manners and raised voice. The court held: "Where there is .such
a show of force as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of
the one in possession of premises that he must yield to avoid a breach
of the peace, this is a yielding upon force and constitutes a forcible
trespass."
If the seller resorts to trick or fraud to effect repossession, the court
will generally find for the vendee. 25 The same is true where the goods
" Crews & Green v. Parker, 192 Ala. 383, 68 So. 287 (1915); Bordeaux v.
Hartman Furniture and Carpet Co., 115 Mo. App. 556, 91 S. W. 1020 (1905);
Webber v. Farmers Chevrolet Co., 186 S. C. 111, 195 S. E. 139 (1938) ; Cecil
Baber Electric Co. v. Greer, 183 Old. 541, 83 P. 2d 598 (1938) (Defendant's agent
acted in a high-handed manner, told plaintiff to "go to hell." Plaintiff left to get
a weapon with which to protect himself. The court found that the agent's acts
tended to breach the peace).
Spangler-Bowers v. Benton, 229 Mo. App. 919, 83 S. W. 2d 170 (1935).
2? Culver v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 645, 62 S. W. 922 (1901).
Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 130 P. 2d 389 (1942) ; Lamb v. Woodry, 154
Ore. 30, 58 P. 2d 1257 (1936).
" Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N. E. 793 (1911).
But cf. Biggs v. Seufferlein, 164 Iowa 241, 145 N. W. 507 (1914) (Defendant was
held without liability for removing plaintiff from atop a stove).
2' Roberts v. Speck, 169 Wash. 613, 14 P. 2d 33 (1932).
"
2 Dooley v. West American Commercial Insurance Co., 133 Cal. App. 58, 23
P. 2d 766 (1933).
-"Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592 (1873); Lambert v. Robinson, 162 Mass. 34
(1894).
"Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Hayes, 22 Ala. App. 250, 114 So. 420 (1927);
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Methuin, 184 Ala. 554, 63 So. 987 (1913) ; Motor
Equipment Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 133 P. 2d 149 (1943) ; Frederickson
v. Singer Mfg. Co., 38 Minn. 356, 37 N. W. 453 (1888) ; Abel v. M. H. Pickering
Co., 58 Pa. Super. 439 (1914).
24205 N. C. 257, 171 S. E. 63 (1933), 47 HARv. L. Rav. 884 (1934) ; Accord,
Binder v. Acceptance Corporation, 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894 (1943).
25 Burhain v. Standridge, 201 Ark. 1143, 148 S. W. 2d 648 (1941) ; W. Cleve
Stokes Co. v. Rushton, 238 Ala. 458, 191 So. 614 (1939) ; McCarty-Greene Motor
1952]
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are returned to the vendor for repairs and he repossesses them.2 0 How-
ever, if the vendor's claim to possession is based solely on a repair lien,
he is entitled to retain the chattel until the lien is satisfied.27 Where the
repossession is accomplished under color of legal authority, the taking
is regarded as coercive and intimidating, amounting to force,28 although
in one instance it was held that the fraud did no more than make plain-
tiff do what he ought to do.29 If the vendor resorts to legal process
which is subsequently declared void, he may still act on his own behalf.8 °
Cases sometime arise involving trespass against the property sought
to be repossessed. Contracts for the conditional sale of automobiles often
provide that the seller may repossess the automobile wherever found.
Under such a contract if the vendor finds the car parked on the streets
unattended and takes it into his possession he will not be held liable.8 1
In an Oregon case, 32 plaintiff and defendant's agent got into a scuffle
over an automobile repossessed by defendant's agent after the agent had
gotten into the car and had taken possession. The court held for de-
fendant finding that the repossession was peaceful and that plaintiff
breached the peace in an effort to retake the car wrongfully. The only
case found in which the seller was held liable under such circumstances
based liability upon damage done to the car when defendant's agent
broke the window to obtain entrance.88 Even in the absence of a con-
tractual provision that the car may be repossessed wherever found,
North Carolina has not found liability where the vendor repossessed the
car when found parked on the street.34
Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 666, 114 So. 60 (1927). Contra: North v. Williams, 120
Pa. 109, 13 Atl. 723 (1888) (Defendant's agent obtained entrance to plaintiff's
house by telling her that they had come to tune her piano. Instead of tuning, he
removed and repossessed the instrument).
" Walker v. Ayers, 47 Ga. App. 113, 169 S. E. 784 (1933) ; Kaufman v. Simons
Motor Sales, Inc., 236 App. Div. 98, 258 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Mur-
ray v. Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp., 160 Tenn. 140, 22 S. W. 2d 227 (1929).2 7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-2 (1951).
28McClure v. Hill, 36 Ark. 268 (1881); See v. Automobile Discount Corp.,
330 Mo. 906, 50 S. W. 2d 993 (1932) ; Firebaugh v. Gunther, 106 Okl. 131, 233
Pac. 460 (1925).
"
9 Day v. Nat. Bond & Investment Co., 99 S. W. 2d 117 (Mo. 1936).
" Ellis v. Smathers, 206 Ark. 247, 174 S. W. 2d 568 (1943) ; Hartford Accept-
ance Corp. v. Kirchheimer, 166 Misc. 219, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 224 (N. Y. Munic. Ct.
1938) ; Grossman v. Weiss, 129 Misc. Rep. 234, 221 N. Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct.
1927) ; Mendelson v. Irving, 155 App. Div. 114, 139 N. Y. Supp. 1065 (1st Dep't
1913); Kismer v. Commercial Credit Co., 114 W. Va. 811, 174 S. E. 330 (1934).
"1Lange v. Midwest Motor Securities, 231 S. W. 272 (Mo. 1921) ; Morris v.
Commercial Credit Co., 55 Ohio App. 391, 9 N. E. 2d 880 (1937) ; Lepley v. State
69 Okl. Cr. 379, 103 P. 2d 568 (1940) ; First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Winter,
176 OkI. 400, 55 P. 2d 1029 (1936) ; Leedy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
173 Okl. 445, 48 P. 2d 1074 (1935).2 Westerman v. Oregon Credit Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P. 2d 435 (1942).
2 Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938).
24 State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S. E. 63 (1932); accord, Jackson v.
Hall, 84 N. C. 489 (1881). (Mortagee seized a mule, harness and carryall on the
public streets).
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Where a chattel not covered by the conditional sales contract is re-
possessed along with an automobile, the North Carolina court has found
liability.3 5 And, in South Carolina where the contract authorized the
taking of any property in the automobile the court held that that privilege
only applied to property not visible and found liability for property that
could have been seen.36
The principal case in denying liability in spite of the technical tres-
pass on plaintiff's premises is clearly in accord with the general rule.
However, if the same facts arose in North Carolina, the court would
probably grant at least nominal damages since a repossessing seller has
no right to enter the buyer's premises.37
JAMES R. TROTTER.
Constitutional Law-'"Separate but Equal" Test
in Graduate Education
In McKissick v. Carmichael1 the court decided that the separate law
school furnished Negroes by the State of North Carolina was not sub-
stantially equal, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, to the law
school furnished white students at the University of North Carolina.
The University law school was ordered to admit qualified Negro appli-
cants. The decision followed by less than a year Sweatt v. Painter2 and
applied the principles first enunciated in that case to a situation ap-
proaching much nearer equality between the white and Negro schools.
The constitutions and statutes of the southern states require the
segregation of the white and colored races in the public educational
system.3 Educational segregation affording equal facilities has been
authorized by the federal courts as a proper exercise of state police
power since Plessy v. Ferguson4 in 1896, a case actually involving segre-
gation in interstate carriers. Segregation in public education was spe-
cifically held to be constitutional in the later case of Gong Lum v. Rice.5
While segregation per se does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
" Narron v. Chevrolet Co., 205 N. C. 307, 171 S. E. 93 (1933) (Personal be-
longings left in the glove compartment and on the back seat).
"o Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 S. C. 38, 185 S. E. 180(1936).
"' Parrisv. Fischer & Co., 221 N. C. 110, 19 S. E. 2d 128 (1942).
187 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 951 (1951).
2339 U. S. 629 (1950).
"The children of the white race and the colored race shall be taught in sepa-
rate schools, but there shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice
of, either race." N. C. Constitution, Art. IX, §2; N. C. GEN. STAT. §115-3 (1943).
For provisions in other states see MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO, 79
et seq. (1940).
'163 U. S. 537 (1896).
275 U. S. 78 (1927). The state may impose segregation in private schools.
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
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